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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group

SUBJECT

Minutes

1. The Warning Working Group met at CIA Headquarters on 12 February, 1981. In attendance were:

Dick Lehman. NIO/W - Chairman
NSA DIA
Pete Oleson, DUSD/PR Bob Martin, State/INR
Dick Kerr, CIA
CTS CTS
, A/NIO/W
RMS, presented a brief

ing on his plans to conduct a study of Washington area operations/alert/warning centers. His purposes would be to identify FY83-87 abilities to utilize the information derived from new collection systems and to review agency plans to upgrade personnel and equipment. A lively discussion ensued. The concensus was that there was ample material available in studies already completed, and that _____ would be better advised to review existing material than to conduct a new study. The Chairman agreed to convey the WWG's recommendation to agreed to provide _bdditional guidance if required after his review of existing studies is completed.

3. 1	he Chair	man di	stribute	ed thre	e papers	on t	ne fu	iture	of the	
لےStrategic	Warning	Staff.	They v	will be	discuss	ed at	the	26 F	ebruary	
meeting.	"									

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4. The Chairman described his recent meeting on warning with the new DCI and announced he would meet with the new DDCI tomorrow re. his warning responsibilities.	25 X ′
5. announced that RMS and CTS will be consolidated. The supplanting organization will be decided on in two weeks or so. Emphasis will be on planning and product evaluation.	25X ²
Emphasis with Be on prainting and produce evaluation.	25X1
7. Mr. Oleson recommended the Group be briefed from time to time on innovative technical developments related to warning. The Chairman accepted the recommendation, stating he could do more along those lines if his staff is augmented.	 、25X^
8. At attachment are a paper on the Alert Memoranda Track Record and a background paper on the Community's warning capabilities.	25 X ′
9. Our next meeting is scheduled for 1315 on Thursday, 26 February. We will meet in the NMIC conference room at DIA rather than CIA Hq. as previously announced (see Para 6 above).	25X′ 25X′
Richard Lehman National Intelligence Officer for Warning Attachments: As stated	

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Distribution: Copy 1 - Peter C. Oleson, OSD/DoD NSA Robert A. Martin, State/INR 4 D/SWS 5 -AD/JCS 6 -JSW-1-DIA 7 -RMS 8 - Richard J. Kerr, D/OCO 9 -10 - SA/CI 11 - NIO/W , CTS 12 - A/NIO/W 13 - WWG File√ 14 - NFAC Registry

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ALERT MEMORANDA - THE TRACK RECORD

The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. It warns explicitly of impending potential developments abroad that may have serious implications for US interests.

The Alert Memorandum was an active vehicle between 1974 and 1976, after which it fell into disuse. When the National Intelligence Officer for Warning was appointed in October, 1978, the Director of Central Intelligence revivified Alert Memoranda. Since then, thirty one have been issued.

The decision to publish an Alert Memorandum is reserved by the Director of Central Intelligence. In theory, anyone in the policy or intelligence communities may request one. In practice, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning usually has taken the initiative.

An Alert Memorandum is not predictive. Rather, it explores reasonable possibilities which, if they come to pass, would have serious implications for US policy. In fact, the greater the potentially adverse effect on US policy, the lower the threshold for issuance of an Alert Memorandum.

It is aximomatic that the amount of lead time is inversely proportional to the confidence of the judgment. There has been a constant, and probably healthy, struggle between the warners, who wish

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
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
to act earlier, and the analysts, who like to wait for more evidence in order to increase their confidence. There is also the problem of false alarms, "crying wolf" in the venacular. One obviously does not want to devalue the currency by flooding the market with warnings. In the final analysis, there is no rule of thumb. Each budding crisis has been judged on its own merits, and the decision of whether or not to issue an Alert Memorandum has been unique to the problem at hand.

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